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Abstract 
As downsizing becomes more prevalent in organizations in the 1990s, 
understanding employee behavior in response to workforce reduction 
programs becomes critical. This study examined the effects of financial 
incentives and performance on retirement behavior, occurring under a vol- 
untary early retirement incentive program at the University of California 
First, using retirement decision models, we examined the effects of 
financial incentives on the probability of retirement. The major component 
of the incentive package was five year's service credit. Results of regression 
analyses suggest that increasing service credit by one year is associated with 
an increase in retirement probability of about three percent. 
Second, we studied the relationship between research performance and 
retirement probability. The evidence indicates no signXicant relationship be - 
tween career publication activity and retirement probability. However, a sig- 
nificant and negative relationship was found between recent publication ac - 
tivity and retirement. This suggests that professors who recently slowed 
down on their research were more likely to retire. The negative relationship 
between research performance and retirement probability was in part affec- 
ted by the University's promotion system, which rewards those who 
continues to publish their research. 
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The frequency and intensity of organizational restructuring increased sig- 
nificantly in the 1990s due to rapid technological innovations, intensified glo- 
bal competition, and economic recession. In most restructuring endeavors, 
workforce reduction is an important component, especially since the latest 
recession, which began in 1990. The downsizing effort continues to spread 
and appears to be ongoing in many organizations(HR Focus, 1996). 
To quickly reduce their workforce, many organizations rely on layoffs or 
employee buyout programs. Although layoffs are a direct and convenient 
way of reducing payroll, they cause serious morale problems and stress 
among the remaining employees(Brockner, Grover, O'Malley, Reed, and 
Glynn, 1993). Layoffs also may discourage employees from investing in 
developing themselves because of heightened job insecurity. In response to 
the problems associated with layoffs, an increasing number of employers are 
using limited-window pension incentives to encourage voluntary retirement. 
A limited-window plan is an innovative early retirement plan through 
which organizations offer enriched pensions to workers above a certain 
cut-off if they retire by a defined deadline. The main objective of the retire- 
ment bonus plan is to encourage older, relatively expensive employees to re- 
tire during a limited time period. According to the annual survey on early 
retirement "Sweeteners" conducted by Charles D. Spencer & Associates, 12 
to 14 percent of major American corporations have implemented limited- 
window programs every year since 1990(Employee Benefit Plan Review, 
1994). As the need for cost-cutting and flexibility intensifies, restructuring 
organizations are increasingly relying on this special retirement program. 
In contrast, research on the limited-window programs is sparse. Previous 
studies on downsizing programs have paid primary attention to job layoffs 
and their effects on laid off employees and survivors(DeVries and Balazs, 
1996: Brockner, et al., 1993: Hitt and Keats, 1992: Leana and Ivancevich, 
1987). Studies on pensions have focused mostly on the structure of pension 
benefits and pension effects on employees turnover(Ruhm, 1996: Gustman, 
Mitchell, and Steinmeier, 1994 : Moff'tt, 1987, 1984 : Burtless, 1986 : Fields and 
Mitchell, 1984a, 198413 : Burkhauser and Quinn, 1983a, 1983b). 
Therefore, our understanding is limited regarding the factors that affect 
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employees' retirement decisions in a limited-window program. One of the 
most important issues in the special early retirement program is the strength 
of financial incentives in employees' retirement decisions. Of concern is how 
many employees would accept the fmancial incentives and leave the 
organization and how much of a bonus should be offered to retire a certain 
number of employees. The addressing of these and related issues would help 
restructuring organizations in designing and implementing a limited-window 
program. 
Another critical issue in a limited-window program is the possibility of 
better performing employees retiring under the special program and moving 
to other organization. Since organizations have to carry out their business 
with fewer employees after workforce reductions, the relationship between 
employee performance and early retirement deserves close examination. 
The present study aims to fill these gaps in the literature by modeling em- 
ployee' retirement decisions based on the life cycle theory of work and the 
human capital theory. We used a sample of 349 faculty members who were 
eligible to retire under a limited-window program at University of 
California, Los Angeles (UCL A) in 1992. 
Pension, Early Retirement I n c ~ i v e s ,  and Retirement 
Since the consequences of a retirement decision influence an individual's 
utility for the rest of his or her life, life cycle theory provides a useful per- 
spective for analyzing retirement(Quinn, Burkhauser, and Myers, 1990). Life 
cycle theory posits that a worker looks ahead over a planning horizon and 
chooses when to retire. When making this decision, the worker's objective is 
to maximize personal utility. 
Pensions have been thought to influence employees' retirement age be- 
cause the timing of retirement significantly affects monthly retirement 
benefits and lifetime pension wealth(Kotilik0ff and Wise, 1987b: Fields and 
Mitchell, 1984). In a defined benefit plan, a monthly pension benefit will rise 
as a worker's tenure with a firm increases. The longer the worker stays with 
the firm, the larger will be the pension. Deferring retirement results in a 
reduced time period in which the worker receives pension income. Thus, 
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pension wealth, the present discounted value of pension stream, increases 
up to a certain age and begins to decline subsequently. If an employee 
continues to work after the peak of his or her pension wealth, the worker 
will be paying an implicit tax by forgoing pension income. The utility of 
work, therefore, decreases as the worker ages. Compounding the pension 
loss effect is the increasing utility of leisure with age. The worker will 
eventually decide to retire when the utility of leisure starts to exceed the 
utility of working another year. 
In addition to the embedded incentives, a number of pension plans pro- 
vide early retirement incentives to encourage old, relatively expensive 
employees to retire earlier than the normal retirement age of 65. As dis- 
cussed earlier, a limited-window program offers highly enhanced pension in- 
come only if a worker decides to retire within a defined time frame. Thus, if 
the worker passes up the offer and continues to work, he or she loses a con- 
siderable amount of pension income. For relatively young workers, for 
example, workers in their early 50s, the lost pension may be smaller than 
the added salary and pension wealth they would get from continued work. 
For older employees, however, the pension loss can be substantial relative 
to the future salary and pension wealth. 
Research Perfixmanee and Retirement 
Human Capital Theory: Human capital theory(Becker, 1993) has mostly 
been used to explain the quantity and the types of investment in training by 
employees and firms. It also provides a framework to understand the re- 
lationship between employee performance and early retirement Becker's 
theory posits that an individual makes a human capital investment decision 
if the present value of rewards from the investment exceeds the cost of the 
investment. If an investment is made, the stock of human capital increases 
and so does the productivity of the individual. The initial investment, how- 
ever, needs to be supplemented by a series of subsequent investments be- 
cause the stock of human capital depreciates over time. 
In a university setting, professors produce research work throughout their 
careers because of the rewards that flow from such research. Research work 
can be interpreted as investment in human capital(Weiss and Lillard, 1982) 
because it enables professors to obtain tenure, promotions, and influence. 
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Professors at the entry level(assistant professors) have an enormous in- 
centive to produce research due to huge rewards, in the form of tenure and 
promotion, that flow from research. After a professor is tenured, he or she 
still has incentives to do research since further promotions and influence in 
the school are mainly dependent on continued research output. However, as 
the career horizon gets shorter due to such factors as older age and poor 
health, professors have less of an incentive to produce research because of 
the shrinking present value of the rewards from research. Thus, those who 
expect to retire within a few years will produce less research than those who 
plan to work longer. Other things being equal, professors who slow down on 
research are indicating a desire to retire early. Professors with continued re- 
search productivity are indicating an unlikeliness to retire early. 
However, since productive professors have more job opportunities in the 
academic job market, they could be more likely to accept retirement 
incentives and then move to other institutions. Thus, in theory, the efffect of 
research performance on a retirement decision has the potential to be am- 
biguous. 
Psychological Theories: Psychologists also offer explanations for the re- 
lationship between research performance and retirement. Summarizing 
psychologists' view, Lawrence and Blackburn(l985) note that researchers go 
through self-examination during transition periods in their late 50s and 60s. 
The self-examination often leads to a decline in research productivity as 
professors begin to realize that they may never become the great disciplin- 
ary scholar that was their ideal early in their careers. Decline in research 
reflects a lack of enthusiasm and motivation, and this could lead to early re- 
tirement. 
Economic and psychological factors generate mixed predictions regarding 
the effect of research performance on early retirement. In the following sec- 
tion, we address this effect using faculty retirement data. 
Defined Benefit Plan at the University of Calgwnia 
The University of California offers a defined benefit pension plan for fac- 
ulty and staff. Employees can elect to receive retirement benefit at any time 
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after they become eligible, i.e. when they reach age 50 and have at least five 
years of service. The size of their retirement income depends on age at re- 
tirement, years of service, and salary. Specifically, the formula for retire- 
ment income is : 
service credit * age factor * HAPC(Highest Average Plan Compensation). 
Service credit is approximately the number of years an employee has 
worked for the University of California Age factor is determined by a con- 
version table that matches an age factor to each age. The age factor 
increases as age increases. HAPC is the employee's average monthly salary 
calculated over the highest 36 consecutive months. 
In 1992, the University of California implemented Voluntary Early Retire- 
ment Incentive Program(VER1P) in response to a serious budget shortfall. 
To be eligible for BERIP, the sum of a professor's age and service years 
must have totaled at least 78. Eligible professors who retired by January 1, 
1993 received three bonuses : (1) additional five years' service credit; (2) ad - 
ditional seven percent increase in HAPC; and (3) a lump-sum cash payment 
in the amount of three months' salary for transition assistance. 
Payroll Data 
Payroll data for faculty members at UCLA are used in this study. The 
data set contains information such as faculty age, salary, gender, service 
years, rank and step, ethnicity, and department. The office of the President 
of the University of California provided the data 
survey 
Payroll data sets do not have information on such items as faculty health, 
marriage, or spousal employment. To gather information that was not avail- 
able from the payroll data, a phone survey was conducted. A letter asking 
for cooperation was sent before the eligible professors were contacted. All 84 
retirees were called, and 82 of them provided usable responses to the survey. 
Among the 391 professors who did not retire, 267 professors provided usable 
responses to the survey. In all, 349 professors responded to the survey, for a 
response rate of 71.4 percent. 
The respondents are somewhat older than non-respondents. Since retire- 
ment rates among older professors are higher than the average, the effects 
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on retirement decision of retirement incentives could be overestimated. 
Faculty Publication Data 
Publication data for the UCLA faculty were gathered from faculty curricu- 
lum vitas, which were provided by the Academic Personnel Office. The 
advantages of using curriculum vitas are : (1) professors' lifetime publication 
records are available: and (2) information on papers as well as books is 
available. 
Citation data also were gathered for these professors to measure the con- 
tribution and influence of their research. Social Science Citation Index, Arts 
and Humanities Citation Index, and Science Citation Index were used to get 
a count of citations for 1990 and 1991. 
Model 
The retirement decision model is: 
Acceptance=ao+a, Retirement Incentives+~, Research Performance+ 
a3 Future Earnings+a4 Health+* Wealth+C aiVi+C BiWi 
Vi is a vector of demographic variables: age, service years, spousal employ- 
ment, number of dependents, race, gender, and marital status. Wi is a vector 
of academic variables: rank and step, employment status, department, and 
campus. Since a professor's decision is whether or not to accept VERIP 
incentives, a logit regression was used to estimate the model. 
Measures 
Early Retirement Bonus : A correct measure of the early retirement bonus 
is the difference between pension wealth if a professor retires now with 
incentives and pension wealth if the professor retires later without 
incentives. Because a pension is an asset composed of a stream of retirement 
income, individuals consider the difference in pension wealth when they 
make early retirement decisions. The greater the difference is, the more 
likely a professor is to retire. Since monthly pension income is determined 
by a professor's age, service years, and salary level at the year of retire- 
ment, these variables directly affect the difference in pension wealth. The 
difference variable is also affected by a professor's life expectancy and dis- 
count rates because these variables are used in the calculation of the present 
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value of a pension. 
In this study, monthly retirement benefit was calculated using a formula 
which is a product of service credit, age factor, and highest average plan 
compensation. Then, a discount rate of 5 percent was used to calculate the 
present discounted value of the pension income. The 5 percent discount rate 
was used, in part, to reflect likely investment alternatives and, in part, to 
replicate other studies on retirement incentives. 
Research Performance: Research performance was measured by the num- 
ber of publications and the number of citations. Although these variables do 
not measure the teaching and service side of faculty quality, research is con- 
sidered the most important aspect of faculty quality in a research institution 
such as the University of California The publication measure includes books 
and published papers reported on faculty curriculum vitas. Papers included 
in the publication measures are those published in journals listed in the 
Social Science Citation Indexes, Arts and Humanities Citation Indexes, or 
Science Citation Indexes. Following methods widely used in the literature, 
we equated a book with three papers(Creswell, 1989: Braxton and Bayer, 
1986). For co-authored publications, two different ways of weighting were 
used. 
1) Each publication is assigned unit weight, irrespective of the number of 
contributors. 
2) Each publication is assigned a weight equal to the reciprocal of the 
total number of contributors. 
Then publication measures were calculated for two periods: 1) for the 
period from the year of Ph.D. to December 1991: and 2) for the period from 
January 1989 to December 1991. Then annual averages for both periods were 
used for analyses. 
To measure influence of research work, the number of citations for 1990 
and 1991 were also counted for each professor. Since the number of citations 
depends on both current and previous research work, it reflects the influ- 
ence of lifetime research work. 
Future Earnings: If a faculty member decides to retire under an early re- 
tirement incentive program, he or she forsakes an opportunity to receive 
earnings from work afterwards. Thus, the greater the present value of future 
earnings is, the lower will be the probability of accepting retirement 
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incentives. In the retirement decision model, hture earnings are measured 
by the present value of gross earnings stream that a professor would receive 
if he or she continued working to some later retirement age Gross earnings 
include base pay, overtime, pay from negotiated arrangements, pay for sum- 
mer session and intersession, deferred compensation, and consulting fees. 
Health: Poor health increases the probability that an individual will ac- 
cept retirement incentives because poor health increases the utility of 
leisure as one's life expectancy is reduced. In addition, poor health 
decreases the utility of work since working becomes more burdensome. Poor 
health, however, could lead people not to retire if they lose health care 
benefits with retirement. Since University of California professors keep 
health benefits even after retirement, professors with poor health would be 
more likely to accept early retirement incentives than those with better 
health. In this study, health is measured by professors' self-assessment of 
health. 
Wealth: If leisure is a normal good, the demand for leisure increases as an 
individual becomes wealthier. Since the utility of income fkom additional 
work becomes smaller for a wealthier individual, work hours will be shorter 
for this individual, other things being equal. Additionally, a wealthier indi- 
vidual is more able to afford leisure, which, in turn, will increase demand for 
leisure. The wealth effect thus will lead to early retirement. In the retire- 
ment decision model, wealth is imputed by using the 1989 Panel Study of In- 
come Dynamics(PS1D) data Wealth in the PSID data includes net value of 
house, other real estate, vehicles, farm or business, stocks, cash, cash 
accounts, and other assets less remaining mortgage principal and other 
debts. 
Age and Service Years: Older professors would retire earlier than 
younger professors because the utility of leisure increases as they age. Age is 
also associated with decreased level of stamina and motivation for work 
(Chronister and Kepple, 1987). Service years may be positively associated 
with accepting retirement incentives since those with more service years 
would want to explore interests and opportunities other than their career 
job. However, longer service years could indicate greater satisfaction with 
job and the University. Therefore, the effect of service years on retirement 
probability is theoretically ambiguous. 
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Spousal Employment and Children : Spousal employment was included be - 
cause individuals are found to coordinate retirement with spouses. Those 
with a working spouse would be less likely to accept retirement incentives 
than those without a working spouse. Studies also find that retirement 
decisions are affected by the responsibility of supporting dependents. In the 
retirement models, the number of dependents is included to control the ef- 
fects of dependents on retirement decisions. In the survey, professors were 
asked for the number of dependents who relies on them for half or more of 
their financial support. 
Table 1 presents a brief explanation of the variables used in this study. 
(Table 1) Definition of Variables 
- --- 
Dependent Variable =O if professor accepted retirement incentive 
=1 if professor did not accept retirement incentive 
Retirement Incentives =difference in present value of pension 
Wealth =F (age, gender, race, education, wages and salaries ) 
Future Earnings =F (gross earnings, year to retirement, discount rate) 







=1 if male 
=O if female 
=years of service at the University of California at time of incen- 
tive offer 
=1 if active on duty 
=O if on leave, separated, or inactive 
=1 if full professor 
=O if associate professor 
=1 if perceived health is excellent or good compared to others of 
same age 
=O if perceived health is fair or poor compared to others of same 
age 
=1 if currently married 
=O if otherwise 
Spousal Employment =1 if spouse is employed outside the home 
=O if otherwise 
Dependents Number of dependents 
Publications per year : 
Career Total Avg Papers and books published during entire career(annual average) 
(continued ) 
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Career paper Avg 
Recent Total Avg 

















(Table 1) Definition of Variables 
(continued ) 
Paper published during entire career (annual average) 
Papers and books published in 1989-91(annual average) 
Papers published in 1989-91 (annual average ) 
Number of citations received in 1990 
Number of citations received in 1991 
=1 if white(not including Hispanic) 
=O if otherwise 
= 1 if Hispanic 
=O if otherwise 
=1 if black 
=O if otherwise 
=1 if Asian 
=O if otherwise 
=1 if Native American 
=O if otherwise 
=1 if biological sciences, or agriculture 
=O if otherwise 
=1 if mathematics, or computer and information sciences 
=O if otherwise 
= 1 if physcial sciences 
=O if otherwise 
=1 if engineering 
=O if otherwise 
=1 if psychology, social sciences, or area studies 
=O if otherwise 
=1 if fine and applied arts, foreign languaes, letters, or theology 
=O if otherwise 
=1 if management, education, architecture, law, criminology, 
social welfare, communications, library science, or home 
economics 
=O if otherwise 
=1 if medicine 
=O if otherwise 
=1 if veterinary medicine, dentistry, nursing, pharmacy, 
public health, optometry, other health sciences 
=O if otherwise 
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Iv. RESULTS 
Descriptive statistics and t -tests 
(Table 2) Descriptive Statistics 
Variables 
-- -- 
Mean Std Dev 
Retirement Incentives( $1,000) 
Wealth( $1,000~) 
Future Earnings( $1,000) 
Publications per year. 
Career Total Avg 
Career Paper Avg 
Recent Total Avg 
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Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 2. The average age and ser- 
vice years are 61.8 and 25.1. Of the sample, 95 percent are males and 90 
percent are whiteshot including Hispanics). Of the 82 retirees in the 
sample, 56 professors(68.3 percent) are recalled and working part-time at 
the University. Eight professors(9.8 percent) are working at other 
universities or research institutions and 14 professors (17.1 percent) are 
working somewhere else (e. g., consulting, business). Only 4 professors (4.9 
percent) completely retired. That most retirees are working at least 
part-time is consistent with the findings of other studies that retirees go 
through partial employment before retiring completely. 
The average total publication per year is 2.03 for retirees and 2.21 for 
stayers for their entire career. The difference is not statistically significant. 
In addition, there is no significant difference in the average paper publi- 
cation per year between retirees and stayers. Similar results were found 
when the publications were adjusted by the number of authors. 
There is, however, a significant difference in the number of publications 
between retirees and stayers during the period from 1989 to 1991. During this 
period, the average total publications per year is 1.76 for retirees and 2.04 
for stayers. The average paper publication is 1.56 for retirees and 1.93 for 
stayers. Differences are significant at the 5 percent level. The differences 
were slightly bigger when publications were adjusted by the number of 
authors. 
Finally, there is no significant difference between retirees and stayers in 
the number of citations they get. The average number of citations in 1990 
and 1991 are: 22.8 and 21.5 for retirees: and 23.0 and 22.9 for stayers. These 
results suggest that retirees and stayers have a similar number of citations 
and career publications. However, retirees are found to have slowed down 
on their research and published less than stayers during the years close to 
retirement 
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Results of Logit Regressions 
(Table 3) Estimates of Logit Regression 











Career Total Avg Publication 
Marriage 
Spousal Employment 










Log Likelihood= - 149.5214 
N=349. 
* =significant at .10 level. 
=significant at .05 level. - =significant at .Ol level. 
The results of a logit regression is presented in Table 3. The difference in 
retirement incentives are positively associated with the probability of 
accepting retirement incentives. As the life cycle model predicted, the pen- 
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alty of reduced pension wealth due to postponed retirement has a powerf'hl 
impact on professors' retirement behavior. The coefficient of retirement 
incentives is signxicant at the 1 percent level. 
(Table 4) Estimates of Alternate Logit Regressions 
for Various Research Measures 
Variables Coefficients Std Error 
Publications : 
Career Paper Avg 
Recent Total Avg 
Recent Paper Avg 
Citations : 
Citations(1990) 
Citations (1991 ) 
* =sigmcant at .lo level. 
=significant at .05 level. - =significant at .Ol level. 
The coefficient of research performance, measured by average career pub- 
lication, is negative, but not significant. Alternate measures of research per- 
formance were used for regression analyses and the results are presented in 
Table 4. The results indicate that recent publication measures, both the 
total and paper publication measures, are negatively associated with 
accepting retirement incentives. The coefficients are significant at the 5 
percent level. This indicates that professors whose recent average 
publications are lower are more likely to retire. Similar results are found 
when the measures are adjusted for the number of authors. Citation 
measures for 1990 and 1991 are not found to be ~ i g n ~ c a n t .  Since the number 
of citations are dependent on career publications and there are no signifi- 
cant differences in career publications between those who retired and those 
who stayed, the relationship between citations and retirement probability is 
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not significant. 
The results presented in Table 3 and 4 suggest that professors' career pub- 
lication measures are not significantly associated with accepting retirement 
incentives. However, professors who slowed down on research in the years 
close to the VERIP are more likely to accept retirement incentives. 
As expected, professors with poor health were significantly more likely to 
retire in the limited-window program. Because the University provides 
health benefits for retirees, those with poor health didn't have to worry 
about health care after retirement. 
The wealth of professors is also positively associated with accepting retire- 
ment incentives. Since demand for leisure increases as the wealth of a pro- 
fessor rises, the wealth variable is found to increase retirement probability. 
Future earnings reduce retirement probability at the 5 percent signifi- 
cance level. The effects of future earnings, reported in this study, however, 
could have been underestimated because only earnings from employment at 
the University of California is used. That some professors have income from 
sources other than employment with the University suggests that the present 
value of actual future earnings could be greater than the present value of 
gross earnings through the University of California. 
Age is positively associated with accepting retirement incentives. Although 
the age effect differs across individuals, age tends to be a proxy for a variety 
of factors that might increase the propensity to retire, such as declining 
stamina and motivation. Additionally, older individuals could regard retire- 
ment incentives as particularly attractive, given the few years of retirement 
remaining. 
The number of dependents is negatively associated with accepting retire- 
ment incentives. Financial burden due to dependents discourages professors 
from retiring early. 
Among the variables in the logit regression, seven variables attained sig- 
niflcance at the 10 percent or lower level. When dummy variables are 
excluded, six variables are found to be significant and three of them are 
economic variables : retirement incentives, wealth, and future earnings. This 
indicates that individuals make a careful financial consideration with regard 
to retirement dicisions. 
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V . DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Retirement Incentives 
When a restructuring organization implements an early retirement incen- 
tive program, one of the concerns is how sensitive employees would be 
toward the incentives. To examine this issue within the University of 
California, the marginal effects of VERIP incentives are evaluated at the 
median of each variable. 
The results demonstrate that the marginal effects of difference in pension 
values are substantial. A $10,000 increase(in 1992 dollars) in the difference 
in present values would increase the probability of accepting the VERIP by 
1.58 percentage point. 
Using these results, we calculated how an extra year of service credit 
would affect retirement probability. Since the additional service credit 
increases the difference variable by $23,625, retirement probability would 
increase by: 
3.73 percentage points= ( $23,625 / $10,000 ) * 1.58 percentage point. 
This means that the overall retirement rate would have increased fkom 17.7 
percent to 21.4 percent if the service credit was increased by one year. 
The marginal effects found in this study are consistent with those found in 
other studies. Using Burkhauser's OLS estimates on pension acceptance, a 
$10,000 increase(in 1992 dollars) in the difference variable would result in a 
9 percentage point increase in the probability of acceptance(Burkhauser, 
1979). More recently, the results of Hogarth(l988) indicate that a $10,000 in- 
crease(in 1992 dollars) in the difference variable would result in a 4.6 per- 
centage point increase in the probability of acceptance. 
While these changes in probability are larger than those in the present 
study, they need to be deflated because Burkhause(l979) used a sample of 
automobile workers and Hogarth(l988) used a sample of New York state 
government employees. That is, a $10,000 increase in pension wealth would 
persuade more auto workers and state government employees to accept re- 
tirement incentives than Unversity of California professors. Additionally, un- 
like tenured professors, the auto workers and state government employees 
made retirement decisions amid several rounds of layoffs and possible 
layoffs in the future. Faced with layoffs, workers are more likely to accept 
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retirement incentives (Hogarth, 1988) 
Perfbrmance of Retiyea and Stayers 
In an early retirement incentive program, another important concern is 
the performance of employees who accept incentives. More specifically, a 
concern at the University of California was whether young and able faculty 
members would disproportionately accept the retirement incentives. In this 
study, the issue was examined using research performance. 
In the years close to retirement, retirees have significantly fewer 
publications than stayers. Logit results also indicate that those with fewer 
publications from 1989 to 1991 were more likely to accept incentives. These 
are consistent with a study by Monahan and Greene(1987), who found that 
professors who rated themselves low on research in the year just before re- 
tirement were significantly more likely to accept early retirement incentives. 
As discussed earlier, economists and psychologists provide explanations 
regarding why some professors slow down on research and retire early. 
First, the human capital theory has significant implications for managers in 
restructuring organizations who want to retire older employees who put out 
less effort. It is not easy to monitor employees' effort level, but according to 
the economic theory, older employees who are ready to retire would be 
expending less effort and would be more likely to accept early retirement 
incentives. Thus, downsizing programs such as the VERIP could be very ef- 
fective in getting rid of older employees who had become unproductive. 
Psychological explanations also important for managers because 
employees with diminished motivation are thought to be more likely to ac- 
cept early retirement incentives. Although this theory was developed for 
university professors, it can be applied to employees in a variety of business 
organizations. Such employees also go through self-examination late in their 
career and, as their motivation diminishes, would be adjusting down their ef- 
fort level. 
The negative relationship between recent performance and retirement 
probability was affected in part by the University's effort to encourage un- 
productive professors to retire. It is known that universities, in one way or 
another, encourage unproductive professors to retire( Creswel, 1989 ). The 
results of the present study indicate that early retirement incentives, 
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coupled with managerial interventions, could increase the effectiveness of 
downsizing programs by inducing unproductive employees to retire. 
Another factor that could have contributed to the negative relationship be - 
tween recent performance and retirement is the retiree recall program 
offered by the University of California. As professors get old, some of them 
become unable to keep up with research, teaching, and service duties, but 
still want to keep their positions with a reduced work load. Retirement 
incentives and recall arrangements could be very attractive for these 
professors who tend to be unproductive. 
In contrast to early retirement incentive programs, downsizing through 
layoffs seems to have different outcomes. Using a sample of 145 production 
workers, Mone(1994) finds that self-efficacy is positively related to intent to 
leave. Self-efficacy is a measure of one's perception of one's skills to com- 
plete each particular duty required to complete a task. Intent to leave is a 
best predictor of employee turnover in past turnover research(Mobley, 
1988). Mone(1994) thus suggests that employees of higher quality are more 
likely to leave when an organization downsizes through layoffs. Since layoffs 
are involuntary and relatively unpredictable, employees who have capabili - 
ties and confidence to successfully pursue job opportunities elsewhere seem 
to be more likely to leave. 
Layoffs are also found to cause serious morale problems and stress among 
the remaining employees(Brockner, et al., 1993). Because layoffs are a trau- 
matic experience, the remaining employees are found to have decreased 
morale and increased stress. 
At present, research on relationship between employee quality and turn- 
over is sparse. Results of a few studies on this relationship suggest that 
employees with low quality are more likely to retire in a voluntary 
workforce reduction program, while those with high quality are more likely 
to leave in a involuntary workforce reduction program. 
Conclusion 
This study examined two important issues of employee retirement 
behavior under a voluntary early retirement incentive program at the Uni- 
versity of California. The first question raised in this study was the strength 
of retirement incentives in employees' retirement decisions. The results 
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suggest that increasing service credit by 1 year is associated with 
approximately a 3 percent increase in retirement probability. Comparing 
this with the results of other studies reveals that the effects of retirement 
incentives differ across age, occupations, and organizations. Retirement 
incentives have greater effects on older workers than younger counterparts. 
Additionally, retirement incentives have bigger effects on production 
workers than white collar employees. 
From a managerial point of view, understanding and utilizing the econ- 
omic nature of early retirement incentives is important because individuals 
are found to make careful financial considerations. By providing "extra" re- 
tirement incentives, managers can induce a substantial number of employees 
to choose retirement. 
Second, we studied the relationship between employee performance and 
retirement probability. The evidence indicates that professors who slowed 
down on their research in the years close to the early retirement program 
were more likely to retire. For psychological and economic reasons dis- 
cussed earlier, emloyees who are less motivated and putting out less effort 
seem to be more likely to retire early. 
Another reason for the negative relationship between recent performance 
and retirement is the human resource strategy taken by the University. The 
organization had a strategic goal of keeping productive faculty menders 
while pursuing workforce reduction. The University put subtle pressure on 
unproductive professors to accept retirement incentives and discouraged 
productive ones from retiring. In addition, the University offered retiree re- 
call arrangements, which encouraged professors whose ability and enthusi- 
asm decreased to retire early and get part-time positions. 
Finally, the results of this study and other studies indicate that laying off 
employees may encourage high quality employees to leave the organization 
while voluntary early retirement incentive programs would encourage low 
quality employees to leave. 
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